A Neoclassical Realist Approach to the Recent Historiography on the Origins of the First World War

Abstract

Interpretations of the origins of the First World War have undergone substantial revision, yet their integration into international relations theories remains insufficient. This paper examines recent historiography through variables identified in neoclassical realism, namely the systemic and intervening variables. The systemic dimension considers European diplomatic dynamics between 1904 and 1914, while the intervening level focuses on decision-makers’ actions during the July Crisis of 1914. It argues that neoclassical realism and recent research allow the causes of the Great War to be summarised in two aspects: first, a confusing system that sent unclear signals and constrained actors, made it extremely difficult for leaders to manage the post-Sarajevo crisis; second, the mistakes of July Crisis decision-makers—their lack of foresight, faulty assumptions, and the accidents and mishaps that emerged—ultimately caused the war of 1914.